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At the beginning of his book Revisiting Kant’s 
Universal Law and Humanity Formulas Sven Ny-
holm asks: “Why Yet Another Book on How to 
Interpret Kant’s Ethical Theory?” This may seem 
like an odd question to begin with. However, 
since there are countless books on Kant’s ethics, 
many written by distinguished Kant scholars, the 
author’s desire to lay out his reasons for writing 
a comprehensive analysis on this subject is quite 
understandable. He offers two main reasons: 
firstly, Kant’s theory is widely misunderstood in 
contemporary Anglophone moral philosophy and 
that is why many objections to his theory fail; 
secondly, contemporary ethics is heavily influen-
ced by “methodological intuitionism”, often lea-
ding to moral relativism or skepticism, and Kant’s 
theory can offer an alternative stance, which he 
calls “moral constitutivism”. In answering this 
question, Nyholm also wants to emphasize his 
opinion that the majority of influential interpre-
tations of Kant’s ethics are in fact distortions of 
his theory; if we truly want to understand Kant’s 
thoughts, we must read his words carefully and 
accept that nothing in his theory is redundant.
The book itself is divided into four main parts, 
of which the first one is the introduction. In the 
introductory chapter, Nyholm explains in what 
sense Kant’s ethics is a “kind of constitutivism”, 
building his view on Christine Korsgaard’s “Con-
stitutional Model” of human agency and its re-
lation to the principles of morality (p. 12). Kors-
g aard offered two models for understanding 
human agency: “combat” and “constitutional” 
model. While the former model explains human 
agency as the outcome of a struggle between 
different forces within the agent, such as passions, 
desires, impulses, etc. (the paradigm example for 
this model is Hobbes’s moral theory), the latter 
pictures human agency as an act of self-constitu-
tion. Korsgaard thinks that Plato and Kant are the 
best representatives of “moral constitutivism”. 
Plato gave the first hint by claiming that the unity 
required for human agency is the same kind of 
unity that the republic with just constitution has, 
and that virtue is the outcome of the inner harmo-
ny among different parts of our soul with reason 
acting as a ruler, helping people achieve inner 
peace. On the other hand, Kant claimed that the 
distinction between agency and a mere behavior 
or reaction to impulses consists in the fact that it 
is authored and that the unity necessary for an 
action cannot be achieved without commitment 
to morality because we constitute ourselves by 
making laws for ourselves. Furthermore, Korsgaard 
claims, the only way to be well-constituted is “by 
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governing yourself in accordance with universal 
principles which you could will as laws for every 
rational being” (p. 13). Thus, agency is the result 
of a person’s constitution and it sets a criterion 
for judging the morality of an action.
Nyholm affirms that moral law is the constitutive 
principle of particular kind of agency and that 
Kant’s theory is a theory of moral constitutivism, 
but he also argues that Korsgaard’s view is much 
more stringent than Kant’s. Namely, while she 
claims that agency is only possible if we act ac-
cording to the moral law we set for ourselves, 
Kant thought that agency is actually possible 
outside of the moral law and that is in fact why 
moral law is an imperative for human beings. 
Because of freedom that each human has, all of 
us exercise some form of agency: if, for example, 
someone chooses not to be guided by moral prin-
ciples, but rather by maxims which promote their 
own happiness, they enjoy freedom of the will in 
the sense they are not absolutely determined by 
impulses (like animals are), and if someone acts 
in accordance with the categorical imperative 
they can be considered autonomous because their 
will is independent from determination through 
the sensual drives. Hence, the agent is any crea-
ture capable of exercising some degree of impul-
se-control by reason. “The agent who is not go-
verned by the moral law is somewhere on a 
continuum between the following two extremes: 
full autonomy through the rule of her own prac-
tical reason, at the one extreme, and a complete 
lack of agency and freedom through the rule of 
irresistible impulses, at the other extreme” (p.14). 
Accepting that moral law is constitutive principle 
of fully autonomous agency (or positive freedom), 
Nyholm relates this idea to the humanity formu-
la. Since we are beings with dual nature – rational, 
capable of autonomy, and animal, subject to needs 
and desires – we can fully realize our humanity 
only if our pursuit of happiness does not come 
before our autonomy. In other words, if our actions 
are always guided by principles which could serve 
as universal laws of autonomous human agency, 
without abandoning our personal pursuit of hap-
piness, the preservation and full realization of 
humanity becomes the most general purpose of 
morality. Therefore, Nyholm concludes, Korsgaard 
is right in claiming that human beings constitute 
themselves through the principles they choose for 
their actions, adding that full realization of hu-
manity is only possible if the sensual aspect of 
human being is governed by the rational one, that 
is, only if people subject themselves to maxims 
that can serve as universal laws.
Furthermore, Nyholm points out that Kant had 
accepted Plato’s analogy between just political 
constitution and just constitution of the soul, and 
this is an additional argument in favor of Kant’s 
moral theory being a kind of constitutivism. 
Namely, the author claims that Kant formed his 
view regarding the freedom of the will by em-
ploying Rousseau’s theory of civil liberty: just as 
people can only achieve civic liberty by subjecting 
themselves to laws they give to themselves as 
citizens, so too human will can only be free from 
external rules by subjecting itself to self-legislated 
laws. The analogy, however, ends here. When 
explaining the nature of moral laws autonomous 
people set for themselves as guiding principles 
for their actions, Kant uses the analogy with laws 
of nature, as defined in his critical philosophy. 
Laws of nature serve as a model on which we 
form our moral laws, and that is why Kant had 
argued that the universal law formula is also 
equivalent to the law of nature formula. In the 
formal sense the term “nature” refers to a parti-
cular constitution or a type of being that is pos-
sible in accordance with some universal law. The 
term “reason-endowed nature” refers to beings 
who can be governed by their own practical 
reason, and whose existence is possible in accor-
dance with maxims such beings give to themselves 
that are fit to serve as universal laws. Conse-
quently, when reason-endowed beings act accor-
ding to such principles, they are making the 
existence and realization of their nature into the 
most general end or purpose around which all 
other actions are organized. On the other hand, 
human beings are also animals with needs and 
desires, from which their general wish for hap-
piness springs. So, when humans make their 
twofold nature and full realization of humanity 
into the most general purpose of their action, 
they never treat other human beings only as 
means for some other purpose, but at the same 
time as a purpose in itself. Thus, the author con-
cludes that the principle of humanity is the con-
stitutive principle of human nature. Extensively 
explaining these arguments and contrasting them 
with various objections all throughout the book, 
he will offer a plausible argumentation in favor 
of Kant’s claim that the humanity and the uni-
versal law formulas are equivalent.
The second chapter is dedicated to a detailed 
analysis of the universal law formula. Nyholm 
firstly presents the main features and characte-
ristics of prevailing understanding, or as he calls 
it “the standard reading”, of Kant’s universal law 
formula, in order to explain the background 
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assumptions leading to “the various seemingly 
devastating objections that have been raised 
against” it (p. 24). These objections are summa-
rized in Derek Parfit’s book On What Matters, but 
they are also previously put forward by authors 
such as Barbara Herman, Onora O’Neill, Thomas 
Hill, Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood. Nyholm 
points out five features of this „standard reading“, 
showing that mentioned authors base their ob-
jections on some peculiar understanding of the 
meaning of Kant’s term „maxim“, or on an inser-
tion of the notion of rationality into his universal 
law formula, or on a quite common disregard for 
the wider context of his ethics and philosophy as 
a whole. Having done this, the author then presents 
seven objections against the universal law for-
mula, designed to illustrate that it has complete-
ly absurd and outrageous implications. Going 
through these objections one will surely understand 
better Nyholm’s motives to write “yet another 
book on how to interpret Kant’s theory”, as the 
extent of distortions, interpretative mistakes and 
overlooked fundamental features of Kant’s theo-
ry had led some philosophers to draw conclusions 
“that we are morally permitted to engage in 
convenience-killing, mass-murder, deception when 
it benefits us etc., while at the same time forbid-
ding us to save drowning children if we are ego-
ists and requiring us not to devote our lives to 
philosophy or to move to Iceland, etc.“ (p. 30).
Moreover, Nyholm stresses, most of these inter-
pretations show a remarkable misunderstanding 
of the claim Kant repeatedly makes that the 
universal law and humanity formula are two 
formulations of one law, or in other words that 
if we subject ourselves to maxims that could hold 
as universal laws, we are in fact treating the 
humanity in each person as a purpose in itself. 
Being unable to understand the logic behind this 
so called “equivalence claim”, some of these 
authors simply ignore it, and some analyze two 
formulations as different laws, attempting to 
prove that Kant was mistaken as the “equivalence 
claim” is false. Because of this, Nyholm offers 
“eight steps towards new understanding of the 
universal law formula” (p. 32) devised to help 
the readers form a better understanding of the 
universal law formulation of the categorical 
imperative, to show in detail why Kant’s “equi-
valence claim” is undeniably true and why all 
mentioned objections must fail. Indeed, if the 
readers had any doubts or confusions about the 
essential features of the categorical imperative, 
Nyholm’s “steps” would help them understand 
every aspect of Kant’s thoughts by indicating 
crucial terms and their meaning, underlining 
Kant’s examples and clarifications, as well as 
notions which have to be considered within 
wider context of his entire philosophy.
In the third chapter Nyholm thoroughly investi-
gates the humanity formula with respects to its 
interpretations offered by influential contem-
porary scholars who teach in the American uni-
versities – the members of “the American school 
of Kant’s interpretation” as he calls them (p. 46). 
What they all have in common is the conviction 
that the humanity formula does not have the 
same content as the universal law formula, be-
cause the former, as opposed to the latter, affirms 
one substantive value – the absolute value of all 
human beings. The point of dispute here is Kant’s 
reasoning leading up to articulation of the hu-
manity formula. The American school believes 
that, on the one hand, he claimed that the hu-
manity in each person has an absolute value, and 
that, on the other hand, he did not defend this 
claim with the arguments having to do with the 
universal law formula being the constitutive 
principle of human agency, but rather on some 
other grounds (upon which they disagree amongst 
themselves). The second controversial issue is 
their understanding of the relation between what 
has an absolute value – a good will and what is 
an end in itself – the humanity within each per-
son. Nyholm, however, argues that the only thing 
Kant had believed to have an absolute value is 
a good will, and humanity „has absolute value 
only in a derivative or conditional way, only 
insofar as it is related to the capacity for mora-
lity (i. e. the possession of a good will)“ (p. 47).
In order to show why the American school’s 
understanding of the humanity formula is unju-
stified, the author locates key sections in the 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and 
main claims Kant himself had made before he 
put forward the humanity formula. At this point 
he is letting Kant speak for himself, cautiously 
clarifying his words and intentions to the reader, 
trying to hold up his own comments. After Kant’s 
words, Nyholm introduces arguments held by 
the members of the American school, most notably 
Wood and Korsgaard. When reconstructed atten-
tively, their interpretation of the humanity for-
mula implies that the humanity and the uni-
versal law formula are not equivalent and that 
Kant attributes the absolute value to the same 
thing he claims to exist and should be treated as 
an end in itself. The author suggests a simple 
test for this reading: if these implications were 
correct, there should be a match between the 
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reasons they think Kant had offered in favor of 
humanity being an end in itself in the Groundwork, 
and those he explicitly gave in other works such 
as the Critique of Practical Reason and The Meta-
physics of Morals. However, bearing in mind pre-
viously cited passages, Nyholm concludes that 
Kant’s own words do not confirm this reading 
and the only conclusion possible, other than Kant 
was completely inconsistent, is that the American 
school’s understanding of the humanity formula 
is not accurate. This conclusion leads to Nyholm’s 
reconstruction of Kant’s reasoning, which passes 
the test of consistency with Kant’s other works 
and, therefore, proves to be superior to those 
offered by highly praised Kant scholars. In addi-
tion, he writes: “In offering us a way of ap-
proaching the basic principles of ethics that derives 
these from the basic preconditions for the possi-
bility of fully responsible self-governing agency, 
while at the same time recognizing that the human 
being also has (if you will) a “non-rational” side 
(which means that many of our personal values 
tied to our individual or communal conceptions 
of happiness are based in our “particularly con-
stituted faculties of desire” or our personal sen-
sibilities), Kant offers us an important alternative 
to the intuitionist approach to moral theorizing 
that plays such a dominant role in much contem-
porary moral philosophy.” (p. 74)
The last chapter of this polemical book explores 
Kant’s views on virtue, human flourishing, the 
highest good and permissibility in relation to the 
humanity formula, by refuting some further 
objections against his theory. The major source 
of misunderstanding on these subjects, Nyholm 
thinks, is the inability to detect two important 
distinctions Kant rigorously makes. The first one 
is between morality and legality: moral action is 
done out of respect for the moral law and legal 
action is merely in accordance with it. Further-
more, the action is permissible if it has the pro-
perty of legality, but, as some commentators fail 
to notice, we cannot infer anything about its 
morality. The second distinction is between ho-
liness and virtue: while it is in the nature of the 
holly will that it necessarily acts in accordance 
with the moral law, human beings are not ca-
pable of holiness; because of their twofold nature, 
people are only capable of virtuousness. Another 
recurrent source of misunderstanding is related 
to Kant’s view of morally ideal human life and 
the content of his notion “the highest good” with 
respect to the humanity formula. Nyholm argues 
that, although concepts of permissibility and 
holiness do have a role in Kant’s moral philosophy, 
in the analysis of the humanity formula virtue is 
the key concept. However, many authors un-
derstood Kant to be claiming that holiness is the 
highest moral ideal (which is false because holiness 
is not even possible for human beings), and that 
the humanity formula’s chief function is to deter-
mine permissibility of actions (which is also not 
the case because Kant’s discussion is mostly con-
cerned with virtue and, as already mentioned, 
there is no inference to be drawn from permissi-
bility to virtuousness). In order to clarify Kant’s 
thoughts on these subjects, Nyholm chooses the 
objections to the humanity formula being a test 
for permissibility made by T.M. Scanlon and Derek 
Parfit, and an interesting (albeit unjustified) ana-
lysis of the distinction between virtue and holiness 
in relation to the humanity formula in Rae Langton’s 
discussion of Kant’s correspondence with his ad-
mirer Maria von Herbert.
After careful analysis of Scanlon and Parfit’s in-
terpretation of Kant’s examples, the author detects 
their basic assumption: that permissibility of 
person’s action depends on what attitudes, mo-
tives, etc. they would be acting on in performing 
these actions (p. 82), which means that Kant is 
mainly interested in the legality of actions when 
he discusses the humanity formula. But, if Kant 
had been exploring the legality of actions, then 
he would have considered only whether the 
action is compatible with treating the humanity 
in each person as a purpose in itself, without 
going into that person’s motives for acting in a 
certain way. Alternatively, if Kant had also been 
interested in morality of actions, then the que-
stion of whether actions are performed on the 
basis of, or out of respect for, the moral law would 
have become the crucial one. In order to test 
Scanlon and Parfit’s objections, Nyholm presents 
Kant’s own words in the suicide example, the 
example of leaving one’s talents and capacities 
uncultivated, the example of being helpful to 
others and the example of the lying promise. He 
concludes that, firstly, Kant was also interested 
in morality of the actions and not just their le-
gality, and secondly, permissibility of actions does 
not depend on a person’s attitudes, motives, etc. 
Therefore, their objections fail because they 
overlook Kant’s crucial distinction between le-
gality and morality.
Having said quite a lot about Kant’s theory about 
one aspect of human nature – the rational one 
– and its capacity for inner freedom (with regard 
to which human flourishing consists in acting in 
accordance with the categorical imperative), 
Nyholm calls our attention to the sensual or 
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animal aspect of human beings. Arguing against 
Langton’s interpretation that morally ideal human 
life includes apathy understood as a state of 
indifference, he claims that human flourishing 
from the sensual aspect simply consists in hap-
piness, viewed as “the achievement of a state 
where we can be content with our lives since 
everything goes in accordance with our desires 
and wishes” (p. 91). Besides morality, human 
beings also seek happiness, and because of that 
making the humanity in each person into an end 
of ours also involves making the happiness of 
every other person an important part of that goal. 
Therefore, Kant’s term “the highest good” relates 
to both sides of our nature, and it must be un-
derstood as the best possible state of affairs we 
could imagine from the point of view of practical 
reason – achievement of both happiness and 
virtue. The highest good is possible “if we sub-
ordinate our pursuit of happiness to the con-
dition that we always act in according with and 
on the basis of self-adopted basic maxims that 
are fit to serve as universal laws in accordance 
with which all human beings can fully realize 
their nature as the particular kind of reason-
endowed beings they are.” (p. 385)
Returning to the starting point of his book, in 
the concluding passages Nyholm defies Langton, 
O’Neill and Korsgaard’s understanding of the 
humanity formula, as they claimed its main pur-
pose is to enable everyone exercise agency. This 
reading captures Kant’s intentions only partially, 
because it does not take into account the sensual 
part of person’s humanity and, consequently, 
happiness of an agent. Therefore, according to 
this reading, the highest good would not consti-
tute the world “of virtue (which indeed involves 
the exercise of fully autonomous agency) in which 
everyone also gets all the happiness they desire 
and their virtue makes them worthy of” (p. 94). 
Making the full realization of the humanity in 
each person into an end of ours involves the 
flourishing of the whole human being – with 
respect to their capacity for autonomous agency, 
as well as their desire for happiness. Thus, Kant’s 
suggestion to use the laws of nature as a type 
when choosing maxims in accordance with which 
we will act, means that we should choose the 
most general principles in accordance with which 
human beings can exist and fully realize their 
nature, and that both the capacity for agency 
and fulfillment of needs and desires have to be 
the objects of the moral law.
Overall, this study presents a systematic, care-
fully conducted evaluation and refutation of 
major objections against Kant’s “universal law” 
and “humanity” formulations of the categorical 
imperative discernible in contemporary interpre-
tations of his ethics, aiming to show that Kant’s 
insistence on the fact that these formulations 
express the same law is not to be neglected or 
considered false.
